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- CY Cergy Paris University
- Research and valorisation
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- Adress : ESSEC Business School - Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105 Cergy France
Contract Theory, Information Economics
Activities / Resume
Articles
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Resale in Second Price Auctions with Costly Participation
Celik Gorkem, Okan Yilankaya , International journal of industrial organization, 54 , p.148-174, 2017 -
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design
Celik Gorkem, Peters Michael , Canadian journal of economics / revue canadienne d’économie, 49 (1), p.374-411, 2016 -
Implementation by Gradual Revelation
Celik Gorkem, Rand journal of economics, 46 (2), p.271-296, 2015 -
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism
Celik Gorkem, Michael Peters , Games and economic behavior, 73/2 , p.375-387, 2012 -
Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision
Celik Gorkem, Journal of economic theory, Vol. 144 (Numéro 1), p. 69-95 , 2009 -
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
Celik Gorkem, O. Yilankaya , The b.e. journal of theoretical economics, Vol. 9 (Numéro 1), 2009 -
On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers
Celik Gorkem, S. Sayan , Review of economic design, Vol. 12 (Numéro 3), p. 209-227 , 2008 -
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents : Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
Celik Gorkem, The b.e. journal of theoretical economics, Vol. 8 (Numéro 1 ), 2008 -
Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints
Celik Gorkem, Games and economic behavior, Vol. 56 (Numéro 1), p. 37-44 , 2006
Documents de travail
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Interested Experts : Do They Know More ?
Celik Gorkem, The University of British Columbia, 2003
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